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THE DIMINISHING ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL
TREATIES AND DECISIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL
COURT OF JUSTICE IN THE COURTS OF THE UNITED
STATES (MEDELLIN v. TEXAS)
by
J.L. Yranski Nasuti, JD, LLM*

The Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution states
that " ... all Treaties made or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the
Land, and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any
Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding." 1 Whether a treaty has been made under the
authority of the United States, whether it must be enforced by
individual states, and whether the president of the United States
can compel a state court to enforce the decision of an
international tribunal interpreting a treaty obligation of the
United States were three issues that the U.S. Supreme Court
addressed in the case of Medellin v. Texas. 2 The Court, in a six
to three decision, concluded that a foreign national, who had
been convicted of a capital offense in a state court, could not
invoke a treaty, a decision of the International Court of Justice,
and a presidential memorandum to preempt the state 's
limitations on the defendant's ability to file successive habeas
corpus petitions. Although the decision involved a criminal
appeal, it provided the U.S. Supreme Court with the
opportunity to articulate a new, and narrow, bright line test for
the interpretation of treaties that is now applicable to all kinds
of public and private international law disputes.
*Professor of Legal Studies in Business, lona College, New
Rochelle, NY
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I.

Treaty Law
The three international treaties at the center of the
Medellin case are the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations (hereinafter "Vienna Convention" or "Convention"), 3
the Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes
(hereinafter "Optional Protocol"),4 and the United Nations
Charter.
The Vienna Convention, whose express purpose is to
"contribute to the development of friendly relations among
nations,"5 formalizes fairly uniform practices among nations
regarding consular relations. Article 36 of the Convention
specifically sets forth the circumstances under which a person,
who has been detained in a foreign country, may have access to
6
a consulate officer of the detainee's home country. Article
36( 1)(b) provides that the detaining authorities must, at the
request of the detainee and without delay, notify the consular
officers of the detention and promptly inform the detainee of
his or her rights under the treaty. Article 36(2) further states
that the detainee 's rights should be exercised in conformity
with the laws and regulations of the arresting county provided that the rules and regulations "enable full effect to be
given to the purposes for which [those] rights ... are intended."
The United States ratified the Vienna Convention, as an Article
II treaty, with the unanimous advice and consent of the Senate.
The treaty became binding on the United States on December
24, 1969. At the time of the ratification, the representatives of
the executive branch assured the Senate that the Vienna
Convention was entirely self-executing and would not require
any implementing legislation. 7
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The Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention, which
was also ratified by the United States, establishes compulsory
jurisdiction by the International Court of Justice (I.C.J.) in
matters involving either the interpretation or application of the
Vienna Convention. 8 It allows a complaining party to file a
unilateral application with the I.C.J. in those instances where
both countries are parties to the Convention and to the Optional
Protocol. The United States was, in fact, the first signatory of
the Vienna Convention and Optional Protocol to institute
proceedings in the I.C.J. based on violations of the
Convention. 9
The final treaty at issue in the Medellin case is the
Charter of the United Nations. Article 94(1) of the Charter
specifies that a signatory of the Charter "undertakes to comply
with the decision of the International Court of Justice in any
case in which it is a party." The Statute of the International
10
Court of Justice, which is incorporated into the Charter,
further states that while a judgment of the LC.J. only "binding
force ... between parties and in respect of that particular case," 11
it is considered to be final and without the right of appeal. 12
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In the Case Concerning the Vienna Convention,
Paraguay alleged that one of its citizens, Angel Francisco
Breard, had been arrested and convicted of attempted rape and
capital murder in a Virginia state court without being informed
of his rights under the Vienna Convention. Breard
unsuccessfully appealed his case to the Virginia Supreme
16
Court and was denied certiorari by the U.S. Supreme Court. 17
He subsequently filed a motion for habeas corpus in federal
court - asserting, for the first time, that his Vienna Convention
rights had been violated. At the same time, the government of
Paraguay filed its separate claim in the International Court of
Justice against the United States. The I.C.J. responded by
issuing a provisional order requesting that the United States
stay Breard's execution until the I.C.J. could deliver a final
decision. The U.S. Supreme Court denied Breard's writ of
habeas corpus on the grounds that he had procedurally
defaulted on his Vienna Convention claim when he failed to
raise that claim in state court and declined to issue an order
18
staying the execution. The state of Virginia executed Breard
without waiting for the I.C.J. to deliver a final judgment. At
that point, the I.C.J. accepted Paraguay's request to discontinue
the proceedings with prejudice.

I.C.J. Case Law
Within the past ten years, the International Court of
Justice decided three cases - Case Concerning the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations (Paraguay v. United
States) , 13 LaGrand Case (The Federal Republic of Germany v.
United States) , 14 and Case Concerning Avena and Other
Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States/ 5 - in which it
concluded that the United States had violated Art. 36( 1)(b) of
the Vienna Convention when it failed to inform the consular
officers of Paraguay, Germany and Mexico that their national
had been detained in the United States.

The detainee's in the LaGrand Case were two German
national, Karl and Walter LaGrand, who had been convicted of
murder and sentenced to death by an Arizona state court. The
German government' s claim before the I.C.J. accused the
United States of violating the Vienna Convention when it
failed to inform the brothers of their right to contact a German
consular officer. The I.C.J. 's judgment, which was delivered
after the brothers were executed, was entered in favor of
Germany. The Court held that: l. Article 36 of the
Convention conferred individual rights on detained foreign
national; 2. the United States failed to comply with the treaty;
and 3. the procedural default rules of the United States
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prevented the rights under the treaty from being given full
19
effect. The Court added that the United States, "by means of
its own choosing, shall allow the review and reconsideration of
the conviction and sentence by taking account of the violation
of the rights set for in that Convention. 20
Mexico brought the Avena case to the I.C.J. on behalf
of 51 Mexican national who had been detained, tried, and
convicted of capital crimes in the United States. The I.C.J.
concluded that the United States had engaged in three
categories of violations under the Vienna Convention. The
first was that the United States, and its local authorities, failed
to inform the Mexican nationals that they had a right to contact
21
the Mexican consulate. The second was that the United
States failed to notifY the Mexican consulate that its nationals
were being detained in the United States.22 The final violation
related to the inability of the Mexican consuls to provide for
23
legal representation for the detainees. The I.C.J. held that the
adequate reparation for these particular violations of Article 36
would involve the review and reconsideration of the
convictions and sentences of the Mexican nationals by the
United States courts. Although the I.C.J. allowed the United
States to decide the means for the review and reconsideration,
it specified that it had to involve a judicial, and not an
24
executive clemency, process.
The Presidential Memorandum
President George W. Bush reacted to the I.C.J.'s Avena
judgment in two ways. The first was to issue an order
("President's Memorandum for the Attorney General, Subject:
Compliance with the Decision of the International Court of
Justice in A vena")(hereinafter "memorandum") stating Bush's
intention to ensure that the United States discharge its
international legal obligations under the Avena decision and
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asserting his power as president to require state courts to
comply with the decision of the I.C.J. in accordance with
general principles ofcomity. 25 Bush's second action was to
instruct the Secretary of State to inform the Secretary-General
of the United Nations that the United States was invoking its
rights to withdraw from the Optional Protocol.
II.

The Preliminary Medellin Cases
In 1993, Jose Ernest Medellin, a Mexican national who
had spent most of his life in the United States, was arrested in
connection with the gang rape and murder of two Houston
female teenagers. It was alleged that Medellin, a member of
the "Black and Whites" gang, had tried to talk to one of the
young women. When she attempted to run away, he stopped
her and threw her to the ground. Her friend was then grabbed
by the other gang members. Both women were repeatedly
raped over the course of an hour. In the end, the gang
members murdered the girls and discarded their bodies in a
wooded area.
When the Texas police arrested Medellin, they gave
him his Miranda warnings - but failed to inform him of his
right, under the Vienna Convention, to ask the government to
notifY the Mexican consulate of his detention. Within hours of
his arrest, Medellin had signed a written waiver and given a
detailed confession. He was eventually tried, convicted of
capital murder, and sentenced to death. His conviction and
sentence was affirmed on appeal. 26
Medellin raised the claim that Texas had violated his
Vienna Convention rights for the first time subsequent
application for a writ of habeas corpus that was filed in the
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27

Texas state court. The district court denied his writ on the
grounds that: 1. he was procedurally barred from a review
since he had failed to raise the Vienna Convention claim at
trial; 2. he lacked standing as a private individual to file
claims based on the Vienna Convention; 3. he had failed to
show any actual harm since he had received effective legal
representation and his constitutional rights had been
safeguarded; and 4. he had not been able to prove that his
Fifth, Sixth, or Fourteenth Amendment rights had been violated
or that the failure to notify the Mexican consulate had affected
the validity of his conviction and sentence. On appeal, the
Texas Criminal Appellate Court affirmed the lower court's
decision to deny the writ. 28
Medellin next turned to the federal courts for relief.
After the U.S. District Court denied his application for a writ of
habeas corpus that was based on his Vienna Convention
29
claim, he filed a certificate of appealability. Shortly
thereafter the I.C.J. rendered its decision in the Avena case. (It
should be noted that Medellin had been one ofthe 51 detainees
named in the petition that was filed by Mexico with the I.C.J.).
Despite the ruling by the I.C.J. that the United States had
violated the Vienna Convention, that the Convention conferred
individual rights, and that the convictions of the detainees had
to be reviewed irregardless of procedural default rules, the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied Medellin's
request of appealability. 30 The Fifth Circuit's decision was
primarily based on two cases - Breard v. Greene31 and United
States v. Jimenez-Nava. 32 (In Breard, the U.S. Supreme Court
held that procedural default rules would trump claims based on
violations of the Vienna Convention. In Jimenez-Nava, the
Fifth Circuit ruled that the Vienna Convention did not create
33
individually enforceable rights.) Medellin then filed, and was
granted, a writ of certiorari by the U.S. Supreme Court. 34
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Prior to the date scheduled for oral arguments in the
U.S. Supreme Court, President Bush issued his memorandum
instructing state courts to give effect to the A vena decision as a
matter of comity. This encouraged Medellin to file a second
state application for a writ of habeas corpus requesting the
Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas to give full effect to both
the Avena decision and the President's memorandum. 35 At that
point, the U.S. Supreme Court dismissed Medellin's pending
case as improvidently granted noting the possibility that "Texas
courts will provide Medellin with the review he seeks pursuant
to the Avena judgment and the President's memorandum."36
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals dismissed
Medellin ' s second application for a writ of habeas corpus on
the grounds that it was an abuse of the writ. 37 It also rejected
Medellin's two main assertions. The first was that the Avena
decision the President's memorandum constituted binding
federal law that would preempt the Texas procedural rule that
prohibited successive habeas corpus petitions. 38 The second
was that the original decision and memorandum did not
consider previously unavailable factual and legal bases, which
under §5(a)( 1), would justify an exception to the prohibition
against successive filing. The denial of the writ was based, in
part, on the U.S. Supreme Court's holding in the consolidated
cases of Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon and Bustillo v. Johnson. 39
Although the Court, in the Sanchez-Llamas case, skirted the
issue of whether the Convention granted individual rights that
could be invoked in a judicial proceeding, it ruled that the
exclusionary rule was not a remedy for an Article 36 violation
and that Article 36 claims were subject "to the same procedural
default rules that apply generally to other federal-law
claims."40 The Texas appellate court concluded that the
Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution did not allow the
I.C.J. 'sA vena decision and the President's memorandum to
preempt the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, Art.ll.701 §5.
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III.

Medellin and the U.S. Supreme Court
In 2007, the U.S. Supreme Court granted Medellin's
second request for a writ of certiorari - this time to review the
state court's denial of Medellin's most recent habeas corpus
41
petition. The grant of certiorari came after the I.C.J. had
already held on three separate occasions that the United States
had violated of its obligations under the Vienna Convention;
the U.S. Supreme Court had rejected multiple requests by
convicted foreign detainees to assert Art. 36 rights; President
Bush had issued his memorandum instructing the state courts
to comply with the I.C.J. 's Avena decision; and the Texas court
had refused to follow the decision of the I.C.J. and the
President's memorandum to grant a writ of habeas corpus to
review and reconsider the conviction. The Supreme Court' s 63 decision was significant because it established an important
new bright-line test regarding treaty Jaw at the same time that it
limited President Bush's vision of presidential power.
Three opinions were issued in the Medellin case: Chief
Justice John Roberts delivered the majority opinion, which was
joined by Justices John Roberts delivered the majority opinion,
which was joined by Justices Antonin Scalia, Anthony
Kennedy, Clarence Thomas, and Samuel Alito; Justice John
Paul Stevens presented a separate concurring opinion; and
Justices David Souter and Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined a
dissenting opinion that was written by Justice Stephen Breyer.
Each opinion tacked the constitutional and presidential power
questions from different perspectives.
The Majority Decision
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For the majority, the first issue was not whether the Avena
decision "constitutes an international law obligation on the part
of the United States" - but rather "whether the Avena judgment
has automatic domestic legal effect such that the judgment of
42
its own force applies in state and federal courts." In order to
answer this question, the Court employed an interpretative
approach to differentiate between self-executing treaties (those
that have automatic domestic effect as federal law upon
ratification) and non-self-executing treaties (those that only
become domestically enforceable federal law when
implementing legislation is passed by Congress). Under this
interpretative approach, the Court parsed the actual text of the
treaty to determine whether Congress had intended the treaty to
be self-executing. A treaty could only become part of the
domestic law if Congress enacted implementing statues or "the
treaty itself convey[ed] an intention that it [was] "self43
executing" and [was] ratified in these terms. " Roberts
viewed the interpretative approach as a way to preserve that
"Framers established [as] a careful set of procedures that must
be followed before federal law can be created under the
Constitution - vesting the decision in the political branches,
subject to checks and balances.'"'4
The majority, curiously enough, did not find it
necessary to determine whether the Vienna Convention was a
self-executing treaty. 45 While the Avena judgment was based
on a violation of the Vienna Convention and created an
international law obligation on the United States, the Court
concluded that it did not necessarily create an obligation that
was automatically binding on domestic law. According to the
majority, the only treaties that were relevant to determine if
Avena had created binding federal law were the Optional
Protocol, the U.N. Charter, and the I.C.J. Statute.
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The Court viewed the Optional Protocol as an
agreement that established a "bare grant of jurisdiction" - and
not a commitment by its signatories to comply with the
resulting I.C.J. judgment. When the Senate ratified the
Optional Protocol, it had not indicated, in its words of adopting
or in implementing legislation, that an I.C.J. decision involving
the United States would have immediate legal effect in
domestic courts. 46 The majority concluded that the U.N.
Charter, and not the Protocol, was the appropriate reference
point to discover what obligations the United States had with
regard to the International Court of Justice. Article 94(1) of the
Charter states that "[e]ach Member of the United Nations
undertakes to comply with the decisions of the I.C.J. in any
case to which it is a party." (Emphasis added.) Even here the
majority thought there was a significant different between
"undertaking to comply" as opposed to "shall comply" or
"must comply". For the majority, Article 94(1) was not a
directive to domestic courts - but rather a "call upon
governments to take certain action."47 The sole remedy
available when a member nation refused to comply with an
I.C.J. decision was a diplomatic rather than a judicial one.
Article 94(2) (which the majority referred to as "the
enforcement provision") states that: "If any party to a case
fails to perform the obligations incumbent upon it under a
judgment rendered by the Court, the other party may have
recourse to the Security Council, which may, if it deems
necessary, make recommendations or decide upon measures to
be taken to give effect to the judgment." Of course, such a
remedy would most likely be toothless if the noncomplying
country was the United States - or any other permanent
48
member of the Security Council in possession of veto power.
The majority noted that this was the outcome that the executive
branch had originally envisioned, and the one that it had
conveyed to the Senate, at the time the United States agreed to
the U.N. Charter and the declaration accepting general

93Noi.23/North East Journal of Legal Studies

compulsory jurisdiction by the I.C.J. 49 If the Supreme Court
allowed Medellin to enforce the Avena decision in a domestic
court, it would not only eliminate the government's option of
noncompliance that was available under Article 94(2) but it
would also " undermin[ e] the ability of the political branches to
determine whether and how to comply with an I.C.J.
decision."50
The majority opinion also pointed to the l.C.J. Statue to
support its conclusion that a decision of the I.C.J. did not
automatically become a part of judicially enforceable federal
laws available to individual petitioners. The language of the
Statue clearly stated that the I.C.J. 's principal purpose was to
51
hear disputes between nations and not individuals and that a
decision of the l.C.J. had "no binding force except between the
parties and in respect of that particular case." 52 Medellin, as an
individual, could not claim to have been a party to the Avena
case (even though Mexico filed its case with the I.C.J. , at least
in part, because Medellin had been denied access to one of its
consulate officers at the time of his arrest.) The Avena decision
was, therefore, binding only between Mexico and the United
States - but not between Medellin and the United States.
The Court further cited a "postratification
understanding" of the signatory countries to the Optional
Protocol and the Vienna Convention in support of its
conclusion that A vena did not constitute bending federal law.
This "postratification understanding" was evidenced by the fact
that none of the 4 7 signatories to the Optional Protocol and 171
signatories to the Vienna Convention had treated I.C.J.
judgments as directly enforceable as a matter of domestic
law. 5 3 The fact that the Supreme Court was unable to find any
other signatory nation that treated an I.C.J. judgment as directly
enforceable as a matter of domestic law strongly suggested to
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the Court that the United States had no need to treat the
54
judgments any differently.
Another interpretation problem for the majority was the
impact that an I.C.J. decision had on state procedural law. The
Supreme Court had previously held, in both Sanchez-Llamas
and Breard, that "absent a clear and express statement to the
contrary, the procedural rules of the forum State govern the
implementation of the treaty in that State. " 55 The Court
recognized that since the effect of the automatic enforcement,
in a state court, of an I.C.J. judgment involving treaty
obligations might interfere with state procedural rules, that
domestic effect must clearly have been stated as the intention
of the body that ratified the treaty. Since this was not done by
the Senate when it ratified the Optional Protocol, the U.N.
Charter, or the I.C.J. Statute, it could not be supposed that the
Senate expected the state procedural rules to be ignored. 56
At the same time that the Court denied Medellin' s right
to individually enforce the I.C.J. judgment in domestic courts,
it also attempted to reassure litigants in private international
law matters that this decision would have no impact on the
ordinary enforcement of foreign judgments or international
arbitral agreements in domestic courts. 57 The Court noted that
the primary difference between those cases and Medellin was
that Medellin had asked the Court to enjoin the operation of
state law and require the state to take action to "review and
reconside[r]" his case. 58 Such a result would be in opposition
to the general rule that judgments of foreign courts awarding
injunctive relief(against individuals or sovereign nations) "are
generally not entitled to enforcement."59
The majority further concluded that while the LC.J.
decision created a binding obligation on the part of the United
States, it did not, by itself, become binding federal law with the
power to preempt state criminal procedural restrictions on the
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filing of successive habeas petitions. This was because
"nothing in the text, background, negotiating and drafting
history, or proactive among signatory nations suggests that the
President or Senate intended the improbable result of giving
the judgments of an international tribunal a higher status than
that enjoyed by "many of our most fundamental constitutional
protections. " 60
The final issue that the Court considered was whether
President Bush's memorandum transformed the Avena
judgment into the law of the land through the exercise of
executive power "to establish binding rules of decision that
61
preempt contrary state law." The majority agreed that "the
President's constitutional role "uniquely qualifies" him to
resolve the sensitive foreign policy decisions that bear on
compliance with an l.C.J. decision and "to do so
expeditiously." 62 At the same time, that did not mean that the
President had the unqualified authority to act as he saw fit.
Pointing to "first principles," the majority stated that "the
President's authority to act must stem either from an act of
Congress or from the Constitution itself."63 To determine
whether Presidential authority existed in this case, the Court
relied on the tripartite scheme for evaluating executive action
that was enunciated in Justice Robert Jackson's concurring
opinion in the case of Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawy er. 64
According to Jackson, "[when] a President acts
pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Congress,
his authority is at its maximum, for it includes all that he
possesses in his own right plus all that Congress can
65
delegate." On the other hand, when "the President acts in
absence of either a congressional grant or denial of authority,
he can only rely upon his independent powers ... [T]here is
[however] a zone of twilight in which he and Congress may
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have concurrent authority, or in which its distribution is
unccrtain. " 66 As a result, congressional inertia, indifference, or
quiescence might enable to invite the President to take on
independent responsibility. 67 Finally, "[when] the President
takes measures incompatible with the express or implied will
of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb" and the Court can
sustain his action "only by disabling the Congress from acting
upon the subject."68
The United States government and Medellin tried to
convince the Court that President Bush had the authority to
require states to review and consider the cases of the Mexican
nationals named in Avena without regard to the states' own
procedural default rules. The amicus curiae brief, which was
submitted on behalf of the United States, presented two
arguments to support its claim that the President's actions fell
within the category that would give him the maximum
authority under the Youngstown model. The first was that the
Optional Protocol and the U.N. Charter gave the President the
authority to implement the Avena decision and that Congress
had acquiesced to the use of that authority. The second was
that the President's foreign affairs authority provided him with
" an independent" international dispute-resolution power. A
third argument, which was proposed by Medellin, suggested
that the President's memorandum was a valid exercise of his
constitutional "Take Care" power. The Court rejected each of
these arguments based on its conclusion that the Optional
Protocol and the U.N. Charter were non-self-executing treaties.
The majority found no merit in the government's
assertion that the treaties gave the President authority to
implement the I.C.J. decision and that Congress had
acquiesced. That was because only Congress had the
responsibility, and authority, to transform any international
obligations arising under those treaties into domestic law. 69
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The Court agreed that the President had the authority, under
Article II, §2 of the U.S. Constitution, to "make a treaty." lf,
however, that treaty did not contain language plainly providing
for domestic enforceability, it was non-self-executing and
could only become domestic law " in the same way as any other
law - through passage of legislation by both Houses of
Congress, combined with either the President's signature or a
congressional override of a Presidential veto."70 Since
Congress had not passed any legislation to implement either
the Optional Protocol or the U.N. Charter, it "did not
"express[ly] or implicit[ly]" vest the President with the
71
unilateral authority to make them self-executing."
Consequently, the President had not acted within the first
category of authority that was described in the Youngstown
model. On the contrary, the fact that the President had
attempted to "enforce" a non-self-executing treaty by
unilaterally creating domestic law placed his actions squarely
within Jackson's third category ofunauthorized executive
action.
The majority also rejected the government' s claim that
Congress had acquiesced to the President 's actions thereby
placing them within Jackson' s second category of authorized
actions. The Solicitor General had supported his argument by
citing a number of instances in which presidents had resolved
I.C.J. controversies with congressional acquiescence. 72 The
Court differentiated the presidential action in those cases from
the President's action in the Medellin case by noting that in the
later that he was "transforming an international obligation into
domestic law and thereby displacing state law." 73 While the
President had "related" statutory responsibilities and an
"established role" in litigating foreign policy concerns, that
statutory role was to represent the United States before the
U.N., the I.C.J. , and the Security Council, but not to exercise
74
unilateral authority to create domestic law.
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The Solicitor General had alternatively argued that the
President's memorandum was binding on the states since it was
based on the President's foreign affairs authority to resolve
75
claim disputes with foreign nations. The Court conceded that
while it had upheld a narrow presidential authority to enter into
executive agreements intended to settle civil claims between
U.S. citizens and foreign governments or foreign nationals, that
authority was not applicable in this case. That was because
there was no precedent to extend that authority to "a
Presidential directive issued to state court, much less one that
reaches deep into the heart of the State's police powers and
compel state courts to reopen final criminal judgments and set
aside neutrally applicable state laws."76
The majority concluded by summarily rejecting the
argument, submitted by Medellin and not supported by the
Solicitor General, that the President' s Memorandum was a
valid exercise of his "Take Care" power. Under Article II, §3
of the U.S. Constitution, the President has the responsibility to
"take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed." According to
the Court, that authority is limited to executing laws - and not
to making laws; Since the Avena judgment was not a domestic
law, it could not be executed by the President. 77
The Concurring Opinion
Justice John Paul Stevens voted with the majority- but
did not sign on to the majority opinion. His main objection to
the majority' s legal rational stemmed from his conclusion that
the text and history of the Supremacy Clause and the Court's
precedents in earlier treaty cases did not support a presumption
against self-execution. 78 That having been stated, Stevens
devoted the rest of his concurring opinion to a discussion of
whether the U.N. Charter and he Statute of the International
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Court of Justice authorized the Court to enforce the I.C.J.
decision in the A vena case.
According to Stevens, whatever obligation the United
States had to comply with the Avena judgment was found in
Article 94( I) of the U.N. Charter. The provision that a member
ofthe U.N. "undertakes to comply [emphasis added] with the
decision of the [I.C.J] in any case to which it is a party" was
not seen as a model for either a self-executing commitment or
non-self-executing commitment. Instead, it was "most
to take additional steps to enforce
naturally read as a
I.C.J. judgments." 7 Some treaties, such as the U.N.
Convention on the Law of the Sea, 80 have specifically provided
for the incorporation of international judgments into domestic
law. In others, Congress has had to pass implementing statutes
to provide for the same result - even then the treaties
themselves had included language far more mandatory than
"undertakes to comply." The wording of Article 94( l) was not
so unambiguous that it foreclosed the possibility of selfexecution nor had the Senate issued a declaration of non-selfexecution when it ratified the Charter. On the other hand,
without a presumption in favor of self-execution or non-selfexecution, Stevens preferred reading the phrase " undertakes to
comply" as "contempt[ating] future action by the political
branches."8 1 This left decisions about whether to comply (and
to what extent) with a particular I.C.J. judgment to the political,
and not the judicial, branch of government.
Although Stevens applauded the President's
memorandum as "a commendable attempt" to induce state
governments to discharge the United States' international
obligation, he still did not think it created binding law.
Nonetheless, that did to stop him from urging Texas to
"undertake to comply" with the Avena decision. Since it was
Texas' failure to inform Medellin of his rights under the
Convention that contributed to the United States having to
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submit to the jurisdiction of the I.C.J., it was appropriate, in
this case, for Texas to "shoulder the primary responsibility for
82
protecting the honor and integrity of the Nation."
Stevens concluded his concurring opinion with a
practical evaluation of why the I.C.J. 's decision should not be
ignored - the cost to Texas in complying with the A vena would
be minimal. It was likely that the violation of the Vienna
Convention actually prejudiced Medellin. On the other hand,
the costs of refusing to comply were significant. Such a breach
would endanger the nation ' s compelling interests in "ensuring
the reciprocal observation of the Vienna Convention,
protecting relations with the foreign governments, and
demonstrating commitment to the role of internationallaw."83
The Dissenting Opinion
Justice Stephen Breyer' s dissenting opinion was highly
critical of the majority's rigid formula for determining whether
a treaty was self-executing or non-self-executing. To the
question of whether the Supremacy Clause required Texas to
follow the I.C.J. judgment in the Avena case, the minority
opinion answered in the affirmative based on its belief that the
majority ignored precedents that established a different view of
treaties under the Supremacy Clause.
Breyer began by considering the intentions of the
Founding Fathers when they wrote, in the Supremacy Clause,
that "all Treaties ... shall be the supreme Law of the Land." The
84
early case of Ware v. Hylton addressed the role of treaties in
U.S. jurisprudence. In that instance, the U.S. Supreme Court
had to decide whether a provision of the 1783 Paris Peace
Treaty between the British and the United States had
effectively nullified an earlier, and contradictory, state law even though Congress had never enacted legislation to enforce

I 0 1Nol.23/North East Journal of Legal Studies

that particular treaty provision. The justices, who were
unanimous in their conclusion that the state law was no longer
valid, submitted separate opinions to explain their different
legal rationales. Justice James Iredell 's decision was
particularly noteworthy, at least in part, because he had been a
member ofNorth Carolina's Ratifying Convention and because
his legal reasoning was subsequently relied on by Justice
Joseph Story, in his classic legal treatise on the Constitution, 85
to explain the intention of the Founders in drafting the
Supremacy Clause.
Iredell noted that the terms of the Paris Peace Treaty
could have been characterized as "executed" or "executory" the former taking effect automatically upon ratification and
later taking effect only when they are "carried into execution"
by the signatory nation "in the manner which the Constitution
86
of the nation prescribe[d]." Prior to the adoption of the U.S.
Constitution, in both the United States and Britain, the
executory provisions only become part of domestic law if
Congress (in the United States) or Parliament (in Britain) had
written them into their domestic law. The adoption of the U.S.
Constitution, however, eliminated the need for Congress to
pass further legislation in order to enforce executory provisions
such as the debt-collection provision that was at issue in the
Ware case. That was because "under this Constitution, so far
as a treaty constitutionally is binding, upon principles of moral
obligation, it is also by the vigor of its own authority to be
executed in fact. It would not otherwise be the Supreme law in
the new sense provided for." 87 Other provisions of the Paris
Peace Treaty that automatically bound the United States
without further congressional action included those requiring
the release of prisoners and those forbidding war-related
"future confiscations."88
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An examination of case law demonstrated that selfexecuting treaty provisions were not uncommon in the United
States and that the Supremacy Clause (which handled the selfexecution issue differently from the approach taken by many
other countries) applied many, but not all, treaty provisions
directly to the states. In Foster v. Neilson, 89 Chief Justice John
Marshall held that in the United States, under the Supremacy
Clause, a treaty was "the law of the land ... to be regarded in
Courts of justice as equivalent to an act of the legislature" and
"operate[d] of itself without the aid of any legislative
provision." 90 The only exception that Marshall could find this
rule was if the treaty had specifically contemplated execution
through legislation and, consequently, "addresse[d] itself to the
political, not the judicial department."91 By 1840, Justice
Henry Baldwin had submitted a concurring opinion, in Lessee
ofPollard's Heirs v. Kibbe, in which he stated that ' it would be
a bold proposition: to claim "that an act of Congress must be
first passed" for a treaty to become "a supreme law of the
land. " 92 In his review of Supreme Court precedents, Breyer
was able to cite 29 cases (including 12 invalidating state or
territorial law or policy) in which the Court had either held or
assumed that particular treaty provisions were self-executing
and automatically binding on the States. 93 On the other hand,
he could not find two case in which the Court had taken the
opposing view and held that specific congressional actions had
indicated that Congress had thought that further legislation was
necessary.94
Roberts ' majority opinion created a presumption that
the treaty obligations were non-self-executing unless the treaty
contained specific language indicating otherwise. According to
Breyer, that was "misguided" since it contradicted the many
instances in which the Court had upheld treaty provisions as
self-executing even though they contained no such textual
language. His dissenting opinion also pointed to the majority's
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failure to appreciate the significance of the fact that it was a
signatory nation's domestic law that determined whether
additional legislative action was necessary in order for a treaty
provision to have domestic effect. The failure to include selfexecution language in a treaty might simply have reflected the
drafters' awareness that not all nations require imf:lementing
legislation before a treaty becomes domestic law. 5 Breyer was
convinced that the presence or absence of"self-execution"
language in a treaty proved nothing and was an example of the
Court "hunting the snark."96 For the minority, the unfortunate
consequence of the majority's decision was that it "erect[ed]
legalistic hurdles that can threaten the application of provisions
in many existing commercial and other treaties and make it
more difficult to negotiate new ones. 97
Up until Medellin, the Court had relied on, what Breyer
characterized as, practical, context-specific criteria" to decide
if the provisions of a treaty were self-executing. 98 That
approach required the Court to look to the text and history of a
treaty as well as its subject matter and related characteristics to
determine, as Chief Justice Marshall had suggested in Ware,
whether a particular treaty provision addressed itself to the
political departments for further action or to the judicial
department for direct enforcement. Matters relating to peace or
war should be the province of political departments - while
matters relating to traditional private legal rights (property,
business, or civil tort recovery) should be directed to the
judicial department. In addition, if a treaty provision conferred
specific and readily enforceable individual legal rights, it
should also be a matter for the judiciary. While Breyer
conceded that the Court in the past had " not create[ d] a simple
test, let alone a magic formula," it had developed a practical,
context-specific judicial approach that sought to separate the
more run-of-the-mill judicial matters from the more politically
charged ones. 99
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When Breyer applied the practical, context-specific
criteria to the relevant treaty provisions at issue in the
Medellin, case, he concluded that the provisions were selfexecuting. His conclusion was based on seven factors: 1. The
language of treaties strongly supported direct judicial
100
2. The Optional Protocol had been applied to
enforcement;
a dispute arising under a provision of the Vienna Convention,
which was itself self-executing and judicially enforceable; 101
3. It would not be logical to make a self-executing promise
under the Vienna Convention, to promise to accept as final an
I.C.J. judgment interpreting that self-executing promise, and
then to insist that that judgment was not self-executing; 102 4.
A presumption against self-execution would have "serious
negative practical implications" (especially for seventy other
treaties that include I.C.J. dispute provisions similar to those
found in the Optional Protocol); 10 5. The judgment in the
I.C.J. case was well suited to direct judicial enforcement since
it only called for the "review and reconsideration" of any
"possible prejudice" to the detainees; 104 6. A finding that the
United State' obligations under the treaty are self-executing as
applied to the I.C.J. judgment does not threaten constitutional
conflict with the other branches of government, does not
require the Court to engage in nonjudicial activity, and does
not create a new cause ofaction; 105 and 7. Neither the
President nor Congress had objected to the direct enforcement
of the I.C.J. decision. 106
Breyer criticized the majority for "look[ing] for the
wrong thing (explicit textual expression about self-execution)
using the wrong standard (clarity) in the wrong place (the
. . ' s ru ,.mg
treaty Ianguage) .,Jo7 A sa consequence, the maJority
has the potential of depriving individuals (including businesses,
property owners, testamentary beneficiaries, and consular
officers) of similar dispute resolution procedures that have
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been provided for in many treaties. In a world in which
commerce, trade, and travel have become ever more
international, this would be the wrong approach.
After briefly considering what the Court should have
done if it had decided that the l.C.J. judgment was
108
enforceable, Breyer turned to the majority's holding that the
President did not have the constitutional authority to enforce
the I.C.J. decision in state courts. According to the minority,
the President had the constitutional authority to act in the area
of foreign affairs. Consequently, when that power was
exercised in this case, it fell "within the middle range of
Presidential authority where Congress has neither specifically
authorized nor specifically forbidden the Presidential action in
question." 109 Whether that allowed the President to implement
the treaty provisions that bound the United States to an I.C.J.
judgment with regard to the A vena parties and to require the
setting aside of state procedural law was an issue that the
. . ra1se
. d - b ut c hose to Ieave unanswered . JJ o
mmonty
Breyer concluded by elaborating on some of the serious
consequence of the majority's holdings. The first was that it
"unnecessarily complicate[ d] the President's foreign affairs
task" 111 by increasing the possibility that the Avena case would
be taken to the Security Council, by worsening the United
States' relationship with Mexico, by increasing the risks to
Americans who are arrested while traveling abroad, and by
diminishing the reputation of the United States for failing to
follow the very "rule of law" principles that it has advocated.
The second was that it "encumbered Congress with a task
(postratification legislation) that, in respect of many decisions
of international tribunals, it may not want and which it may
find difficult to execute." 112 Finally, it weaken[ed] the rule of
law for which the Constitution stands since it ma[de] it more
113
difficult to enforce judgments of international tribunals.
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The Final Resolution
The State of Texas executed Jose Medellin on August
5, 2008. Medellin had filed a request for a stay of execution
with the U.S. Supreme Court. The petition was based on the
possibility that Congress or the Texas state legislature "might
determine that actions of the International Court.. should be
given controlling weight in determining that a violation of the
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations is grounds for
114
vacating the sentence imposed in this suit."
The Court's per
curium decision, which was supported by five of the justices,
denied Medellin's request based on its conclusion that the
likelihood of any legislative action occurring was much too
remote to justify a stay. The majority further noted that th only
legislative and executive steps that had been taken in the four
years since the I.C.J. ruling and in the four months since the
Supreme Court's last ruling were the introduction of a
Congressional bill to implement the obligations under the
treaty 115 and the withdrawal of the United States' accession to
the jurisdiction of the I.C.J. in matters relating to the Vienna
Convention. The Court also found it significant that the U.S.
Department of Justice has not sought to intervene in the
matter. 116
The four dissenting justices submitted separate opinions
- each favoring the granting of the stay until there could be
input by the Solicitor General. Justice Stevens reiterated his
previous conclusion that neither the President nor the I.C.J.
could require Texas to determine whether it had prejudiced
Medellin when it violated the Vienna Convention.
Nonetheless, he concluded that the fact that Texas had not
exerted its authority (and duty under international law) to
remedy the "potentially significant breach of the United States'
treaty obligations" justified a request for the Solicitor General's
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view on this matter of serious national security and foreign
policy. 11 7 Justice Souter pointed to the bill pending in
Congress and the government's representation to the I.C.J. that
it would take further steps to enforce the Avena judgment as
sufficient justification to grant the stay of execution and to hear
the views of the Solicitor General. 118 Justice Ginsburg also
supported granting Medellin's petition in order to seek the
Solicitor General's clarification of a representation that the
United States had made to the I.C.J. in response to Mexico ' s
119
request for provisional measure in the Avena case.
Finally,
Justice Breyer cited six reasons for granting the stay. In
addition to pointing out that Mexico had returned to the I.C.J.
seeking U.S. compliance with its international obligations and
that legislation had been introduced in Congress to "provide
the legislative approval necessary to transform [the United
States'] international legal obligations into binding domestic
law," 120 Breyer also argued that Congress, prior to the Court's
decision in Medellin, may have assumed that the relevant
treaties were self-executing and did not require implementing
legislation, that proceeding with the execution would constitute
an irremediable violation of international law, that the views of
the Executive were pertinent to this matter of foreign affairs,
and that the Court had incorrectly focused on the narrow issue
of whether the original confession of Medellin was unlawfully
obtained rather than the more important issue of whether the
United States would carry out its international obligation to
12 1
enforce the decision of the I.C.J.
IV.
The U.S. Supreme Court's decision in the Medellin case was a
setback to the international law community and to the Bush
administration. While Chief Justice Roberts' majority opinion
attempted to create certitude in one area of treaty interpretation
(by establishing the presumption that treaties are non-self-
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executing unless they contain explicit language of intent), it
failed to address the practical consequences of that decision. A
wide variety of treaties (which lack the explicit language but
which, nevertheless, had been thought to be self-executing)
will need to be reviewed to see if implementing legislation is
necessary. The treaty partners of the United States will have
new grounds for wondering if the United States is really
committed to honoring its international obligations. U.S.
citizens who travel abroad for business or pleasure should be
justifiably concerned that they might not continue to rely on the
reciprocal protection of the Vienna Convention - especially in
those countries with national who have been denied the same
protections in the United States. The decision also place limits
on the President's view of his power in matters of foreign
policy. The executive branch's attempts to unilaterally trump
the objections of the state court in this matter offended the
Court's understanding of the role of separation of powers and
federalism. It was somewhat ironic that President Bush, who
had often appeared indifferent, if not hostile, to international
law issues, found his power restricted by the Court in the one
instance where he had directed state courts to "give effect" to a
decision of the I.C.J.. As a result of its decision in Medellin,
the Court appears to have concluded that the United States
continues to have international law obligations - but not a
commitment - to comply with the I.C.J. 's ruling in Avena.
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